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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Defendants Louis Manzo (“Louis”) and Ronald Manzo 
(“Ronald”) were indicted as the result of a federal investigation 
into public corruption and money laundering in Hudson County, 
 
3 
New Jersey.  They were charged with, inter alia, conspiracy to 
commit extortion under color of official right in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (the “Hobbs Act”) and attempted extortion 
under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act.  The 
District Court dismissed the conspiracy and attempt charges 
because it concluded that neither Louis, an unsuccessful mayoral 
candidate, nor Ronald, his brother and campaign manager, acted 
“under color of official right.”  On appeal, the government 
argues that the conduct is within the scope of the Hobbs Act 
based on the principles underlying the inchoate crimes of 
attempt and conspiracy.  For the reasons stated herein, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Specifically, we hold 
that acting “under color of official right” is a required element 
of an extortion Hobbs Act offense, inchoate or substantive, 
when that offense does not involve threatened force, violence or 
fear. 
I. 
 The parties are in basic agreement on the facts.  In May 
2006, Solomen Dwek was arrested by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) on bank fraud charges.  He subsequently 
agreed to become a cooperating witness for the FBI, assisting 
with an investigation into public corruption.  In that role, Dwek 
posed as a real estate developer who was looking for assistance 
expediting his development projects through local government 
processes.  Dwek surreptitiously recorded many of the meetings 
he attended.  The investigation, dubbed “Bid Rig III,” resulted in 
the arrest of numerous Jersey City, New Jersey politicians on 
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July 23, 2009.1
 Two individuals who previously accepted corrupt 
payments from Dwek, Edward Cheatam and Maher Khalil,
  Among those arrested were Louis and Ronald 
Manzo (collectively, the “Manzos”). 
 Louis was an unsuccessful Jersey City mayoral candidate 
in the election held on May 12, 2009.  Although he had 
previously held public office in other capacities, he was not a 
public official at the relevant time here and did not pretend to be 
one.  Ronald is the brother of Louis, and acted as his campaign 
manager and political advisor for the 2009 mayoral election. 
2
                                                 
 1 We note that several Bid Rig III defendants have pled 
guilty to similar charges.  Other Bid Rig III cases have been 
stayed by the District Court pending the outcome of this appeal. 
 2 Cheatam served as a Commissioner on the Jersey City 
Housing Authority and was also the affirmative action officer 
for Hudson County.  Khalil was an employee of the Jersey City 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
 
suggested that Dwek meet with Louis to protect his real estate 
development interests in Jersey City.  Accordingly, the Manzos, 
Dwek and Cheatam participated in a series of six meetings, 
spanning from February 2009 to April 2009.  Over the course of 
those meetings, Dwek agreed to make cash payments and illicit 
contributions to Louis’s campaign in exchange for his future 
official assistance, action and influence.  The Manzos accepted 
three cash payments from Dwek totaling $27,500 prior to the 
election.  Dwek also agreed to pay the Manzos an additional 
$17,500 after Louis was elected, in exchange for Louis’s official 
assistance as mayor. 
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 The payments were made in furtherance of two separate 
schemes.  First, Louis agreed to expedite approvals of a 
particular Jersey City real estate development project known as 
the “Garfield Development.”  In exchange, Dwek paid the 
Manzos $20,000 before the election and promised to pay an 
additional $10,000 after Louis was elected.  Second, Louis 
agreed to promote Khalil in exchange for a payment of $7,500 
before the election and the promise of an additional $7,500 after 
the election. 
 The election was held on May 12, 2009, and Louis 
received 26% of the vote, finishing second in a five-candidate 
field.  Mayor Jerramiah Healy received 53% of the vote and was 
re-elected.  Because Louis was not elected mayor, he did not 
receive either of the two post-election payments that were 
agreed upon in furtherance of the two schemes. 
 On October 6, 2009, a grand jury in the District of New 
Jersey returned a six-count indictment, which charged the 
Manzos with:  (1) one count of conspiracy to commit extortion 
under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act; 
(2) three counts of attempted extortion under color of official 
right in violation of the Hobbs Act; and (3) two counts of travel 
in interstate commerce to promote, carry on and facilitate 
bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3), 2.  On April 20, 
2010, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment with a 
seventh count, charging the Manzos with mail fraud in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 Louis Manzo filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of 
Counts One through Four, which charged the Hobbs Act 
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conspiracy and attempt offenses.  For the government to prove a 
violation of the Hobbs Act using the “under color of official 
right” theory, it “need only show that a public official has 
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that 
the payment was made in return for official acts.”  Evans v. 
United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).  Louis argued that the 
government could not meet this burden because at all relevant 
times he was merely a candidate and did not act “under color of 
official right” as a public official.  Ronald joined in the motion. 
 The District Court granted the Manzos’ motion seeking 
dismissal of the Hobbs Act attempt and conspiracy charges.  It 
applied the rule of lenity, and held that the conduct was “not 
clearly within the scope of the Hobbs Act even if only 
conspiracy or attempt [was] charged.”  United States v. Manzo, 
714 F. Supp. 2d 486, 496 (D.N.J. 2010).  Specifically, the 
District Court held that because neither Louis nor Ronald held 
public office, they did not act “under color of official right.”  Id. 
at 500.  It therefore dismissed the conspiracy and attempt 
charges because the indictment insufficiently alleged the 
elements of the offense intended to be charged.  The 
government timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3731. 
 We have plenary review over the sufficiency of an 
indictment to charge an offense.  United States v. Yusuf, 536 
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F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2008).  An indictment is “sufficient so 
long as it (1) contains the elements of the offense intended to be 
charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must 
be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with 
accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or 
conviction in the event of a subsequent prosecution.”  United 
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We presume that the factual 
allegations in an indictment are true for the purpose of this 
analysis.  United States v. Besmajian, 910 F.2d 1153, 1154 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
III. 
 This case presents a significant and novel question, 
creatively framed and well-presented by the government.  In 
essence, it asks us to consider whether an unsuccessful 
candidate for public office can attempt or conspire to obtain 
property from another with that person’s consent induced under 
color of official right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.3
                                                 
 3 For the purpose of this appeal, both Ronald and Louis 
are treated the same.  A private citizen may be convicted of 
extortion under the Hobbs Act “if that private citizen either 
conspires with, or aids and abets, a public official in the act of 
extortion.”  United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 
2005); see also United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 958-59 
(9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1382 
(5th Cir. 1995). 
  
Whether the Manzos can be charged with conspiracy or attempt 
 
8 
to violate the Hobbs Act turns initially on whether they acted 
“under color of official right.”4
                                                 
 4 The other elements of a Hobbs Act violation were 
clearly met in this case.  First, both parties concede that the 
Manzos obtained property from another with his consent.  
Second, the interstate commerce element is satisfied.  Even 
though the agreement was local and the product of a government 
sting operation, we require only “proof of a [potential] de 
minimis effect on interstate commece.”  United States v. Urban, 
404 F.3d 754, 766 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Lopez-Morrison-
Jones analysis).  We have previously found that both local and 
fictitious schemes satisfy the interstate commerce element of a 
Hobbs Act violation.  See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 
578, 590-94 (3d Cir. 1982).  Accordingly, the interstate 
commerce element is met here. 
 
 The District Court concluded that the Manzos were not 
acting “under color of official right” because:  (a) the Hobbs Act 
is ambiguous and the legislative history supports a narrow 
construction of the phrase; (b) the congressional purpose of the 
statute corresponds with a narrow construction; and (c) the rule 
of lenity applies to narrow the application of the ambiguous 
statute.  Moreover, the District Court concluded that acting 
“under color of official right” was a requirement even for 
prosecution of an inchoate violation of the Hobbs Act that did 
not involve threatened force, violence or fear.  We agree and 
conclude that, because the Manzos did not act “under color of 
official right,” they may not be charged with attempt or 
conspiracy to extort in violation of the Hobbs Act. 
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A. 
 To determine whether the Manzos’ conduct falls within 
the Hobbs Act, we begin with the plain meaning of the “under 
color of official right” language.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter[.]”); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The Hobbs Act provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of 
any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to 
do, or commits or threatens physical violence to 
any person or property in furtherance of a plan or 
purpose to do anything in violation of this section 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than twenty years, or both. 
(b) As used in this section— 
 … 
 (2) The term “extortion” means the 
obtaining of property from another, with his 
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color 
of official right. 
18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
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 The scope of the term “under color of official right” is 
not readily apparent from the face of the statute.  Indeed, courts 
have grappled with ambiguity embedded in the text of the Hobbs 
Act, and in particular, the “under color of official right” 
language.  The ambiguity has led some judges to comment that 
“the phrase ‘under color of official right’, standing alone, is 
vague almost to the point of unconstitutionality.”  United States 
v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 695 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafeiland, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The debate over 
the interpretation of the “under color of official right” language 
is ongoing; “[o]ther defendants are at loggerheads with the 
United States on this question; district judges disagree about the 
subject; . . . [w]e cannot settle the scope of the Hobbs Act; only 
Congress or the Supreme Court can do so.”  United States v. 
McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring).  We have grappled previously with the ambiguity 
of the Hobbs Act language, and, in an attempt to shed light on 
the language, thoroughly discussed its legislative history.  See 
United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 649-56 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(en banc) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative history 
of “under color of official right”); see also United States v. 
Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979) (Aldisert, J., 
dissenting) (same).  However, we have yet to confront squarely 
the question before us. 
 Because the statute is not clear on its face, we normally 
look to legislative history to discern congressional intent.  See, 
e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Unfortunately, when the Hobbs Act was passed, no mention was 
made of the meaning of extortion “under color of official right” 
in the legislative history.  Because “[t]he legislative history is 
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sparse and unilluminating with respect to the offense of 
extortion,” the Supreme Court has directed us to presume that 
Congress intended to adopt the common law meaning of a 
phrase.  Evans, 504 U.S. at 264. 
 “Extortion is one of the oldest crimes in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.”  Id. at 278 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  At common 
law, the phrase “extortion under color of official right” was a 
legal term of art that encompassed only the actions of public 
officials.  Id. at 260; Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 650.  Extortion was 
defined as “any officer’s unlawfully taking, by color of his 
office, from any man, any money or thing of value that is not 
due to him.”  4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries.5
                                                 
 5 Blackstone used the phrase “by color of his office,” 
rather than “under color of official right,” which appears in the 
Hobbs Act.  This difference is immaterial because the exact 
language in the Hobbs Act was likely derived from an 
influential treatise on the criminal law of England, written by 
William Hawkins, which said: 
 
[I]t is said, [t]hat extortion in a large sense 
signifies any oppression under color of right; but 
that in a strict sense, it signifies the taking of 
money by any officer, by color of his office, either 
where none at all is due, or not so much is due, or 
where it is not yet due. 
 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 261 n.4 (1992) (quoting 1 
W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 316 (6th ed. 1787)). 
  The “essence of 
the offense was the abuse of the public trust that inhered in the 
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office.”  Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 650.  Early case law demonstrated 
a strict adherence to the narrow common law construction of the 
phrase: 
The offense consists in the oppressive misuse of 
the exceptional power with which the law invests 
the incumbent of an office.  It is thus apparent 
that the crime of extortion is committable only by 
an officer.  The officer need not possess a legal 
title to the office whose functions he executes.  A 
person who serves as an officer, and claims to be 
one[,] is estopped to deny his official 
appointment.  2 Bish. Cr. Law, s 392.  So it 
appears that a de facto as well as a de jure officer 
is punishable for extortion, as he is for any other 
malfeasance in office.  But an official character, 
either de facto or de jure, is essential.  The 
indictment is drawn in the usual form, and 
charges that the defendants were officers, and, by 
color of their office, extorted.  This is a material 
averment, proof of which is absolutely required to 
support a conviction. 
Id. (quoting Kitby v. State, 31 A. 213, 213-14 (N.J. 1894)) 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, common law extortion, which 
extended only to the actions of a public official or someone 
acting with the power of a public official, does not encompass 
the Manzos’ conduct. 
 The statutory offense of extortion mirrors the narrow 
common law interpretation.  The word “extortion,” as used in 
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the Hobbs Act, first appeared in the Anti-Racketeering Act of 
1946 (“1946 Act”), which amended the Anti-Racketeering Act 
of 1934 (“1934 Act”).  The 1934 Act addressed primarily labor 
racketeering, but also proscribed an offense that we now define 
as extortion: obtaining property “under color of official right.”  
Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 652.  The 1934 Act was interpreted 
narrowly in United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 
(1942), which ultimately led to its amendment in 1946.  The 
1946 Act broadened the description of coercive extortion to 
include “threatened force or fear,” but merely carried forward 
the “under color of official right” language.  Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 
652.  Accordingly, we look back to the legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of the 1934 Act to discern any 
legislative history relevant to the “under color of official right” 
language.  Id. 
 There is surprisingly little legislative history 
accompanying the 1934 Act, and what little exists reveals that it 
“was [not] intended to empower federal authorities to police 
influence peddling in the political processes of the states.”  Id.  
The 1934 Act was proposed by the Senate and initially 
contained no mention of the phrase “under color of official 
right.”  Id.  After passing the Senate, it was submitted to the 
House, where it was completely amended.  Id.  The House 
revision added the phrase “under color of official right” for the 
first time, but a letter explaining the revisions failed to mention 
the rationale for inclusion of the phrase.  Id.  The omission 
“suggests that the draftsmen did not intend the prohibition to 
reach conduct not extortionate at common law.”  Id. at 653. 
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 In fact, we can trace the identical “under color of official 
right” language back to the New York Penal Law of 1909, 
which, in turn, borrowed the language from a penal code 
prepared by David Dudley Field and others (the 
“Commissioners”).  Commissioners of the Code, The Penal 
Code of the State of New York (1865).  The Field version 
provided: “Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, 
with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or 
under color of official right.”  Id. 
 In an explanatory note to the Field version, the 
Commissioners cited to People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1827), for the derivation of the “under color of official 
right” language.  Whaley involved a common law extortion suit 
where the presiding justice ultimately collected a fee to which he 
was not entitled under the law.  Id. at 661.  The court found that 
the fee had been extorted “under color of official right.”  Id.  
The court defined the offense as follows: 
Extortion signifies, in an enlarged sense, any 
oppression under color of right.  In a stricter 
sense, it signifies the taking of money by any 
officer, by color of his office; either, where none 
at all is due, or not so much due, or when it is not 
yet due. 
Id. 
 Field’s definition of extortion, derived from Whaley, was 
first enacted verbatim into the New York Penal Code of 1881, 
ch. 676, section 552.  The drafters also included Section 556 to 
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expand upon the definition of extortion committed “under color 
of official right.”  Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 654.  Section 556 
provided that: 
A public officer, or a person pretending to be 
such, who unlawfully and maliciously, under 
pretense of color or official authority, 
1. Arrests another, or detains him against his will; 
or 
2. Seizes or levies upon another’s property; or 
3. Dispossesses another of any lands or 
tenements; or 
4. Does any other act, whereby another person is 
injured in his person, property, or rights; 
Commits oppression and is guilty of 
misdemeanor. 
 The New York Penal Code of 1909 later adopted Section 
556 as well as the “under color of official right” language.  “The 
New York statute intended to proscribe common law extortion 
which required an act or pretended act in an official capacity.”  
Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 654.  The statutory language tracing back to 
1827 reveals that “the portion of the [Hobbs Act] that refers to 
official misconduct continues to mirror the common-law 
definition.”  Evans, 504 U.S. at 264.  Extortionate conduct 
committed “under color of official right” must be action in an 
official capacity or a pretended act in an official capacity, which 
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means one pretends to hold an office that he in fact does not.  
Therefore, we conclude that because the Manzos neither acted 
nor pretended to act in an official capacity, their conduct was 
not “under color of official right.”6
                                                 
6 As a general rule, only public officials may be charged 
using the “under color of official right” theory.  United States v. 
Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir. 1972).  However, we do 
not assert that a candidate for public office may never violate the 
Hobbs Act by acting “under color of official right.”  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has considered a Hobbs Act question involving a 
candidate for re-election to public office.  In McCormick v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), the Supreme Court 
considered whether campaign contributions received “under 
color of official right” by a successful candidate required a quid 
pro quo element to constitute a Hobbs Act violation. 
 
 The Supreme Court distinguished between valid 
“political contributions” and extortion under the Hobbs Act.  It 
held that a candidate running for re-election could violate the 
Hobbs Act by accepting certain bribes.  It noted that 
 
 
[p]olitical contributions are of course vulnerable 
if induced by the use of force, violence or fear.  
The receipt of such contributions is vulnerable 
under the Act as having been taken under color of 
official right, but only if the payments are made in 
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by 
the official to perform or not to perform an 
official act.  In such situations the official asserts 
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B. 
 The narrow common law reading of the “under color of 
official right” language is also consistent with congressional 
purpose.  Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 645.  Congress sought to proscribe 
coercive activity through enactment of the Hobbs Act.  Under 
the terms of the Hobbs Act, a person can only commit extortion 
in one of two ways:  (1) through threatened force, violence or 
fear or (2) under color of official right.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(b)(2).  Both of these types of extortion are inherently 
coercive.  The District Court found that the Manzos’ actions did 
not involve any coercion, and were thus outside the ambit of the 
Hobbs Act. 
 The government argues that the District Court erred in 
inserting a “coercion requirement” into the Hobbs Act.  This 
argument mischaracterizes the District Court’s reasoning.  In 
exploring the congressional purpose underlying the Hobbs Act, 
the District Court correctly apprehended that Congress sought to 
criminalize only coercive exchanges.  In essence, when 
                                                 
that his official conduct will be controlled by the 
terms of the promise or undertaking.  This is the 
receipt of money by an elected official under 
color of official right within the meaning of the 
Hobbs Act. 
 
Id. at 273.  Unlike McCormick, Louis was not a public official 
at the time of the events in question.  He was therefore not an 
“official assert[ing] that his official conduct [would] be 
controlled by the terms.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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proceeding under a “color of official right” theory, the “misuse 
of public office is said to supply the element of coercion.”  
United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1976) 
(quoting Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 644-45).  Therefore, while the 
element of coercion is subsumed in the “under color of official 
right” theory, it is not a separate element that the government 
must prove.  Rather, coercion is merely the justification for 
permitting a prosecution under the Hobbs Act. 
 The government argues that the implicit coercion 
requirement was met because Louis agreed and intended to 
obtain additional cash from Dwek after being elected mayor and 
in exchange for exercising his official powers as mayor.  This 
argument is unpersuasive.  The Manzos never acted “under 
color of official right” and never used force.  Therefore, their 
actions were not of the coercive type targeted by Congress in the 
Hobbs Act.7
                                                 
 7 Instead, as the Manzos point out, Congress recognizes 
and targets candidates as a distinct class under the criminal law. 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 599: 
 
 
Whoever, being a candidate, directly or indirectly 
promises or pledges the appointment, or the use of 
his influence or support for the appointment of 
any person to any public or private position or 
employment, for the purpose of procuring support 
in his candidacy shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if 
the violation was willful, shall be fined under this 
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 In accordance with the legislative history, the 
congressional purpose underlying the Hobbs Act and centuries 
of interpretation of the phrase “under color of official right,” we 
conclude that the Manzos were not acting “under color of 
official right,” as defined in the Hobbs Act.8
 Having concluded that the Manzos did not act “under 
color of official right,” we must determine whether they 
nonetheless may be prosecuted for the inchoate offenses of 
conspiracy or attempt.  The government argues that the 
 
C. 
                                                 
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both. 
 
Although this statute only applies to federal candidates, not state 
candidates, it reveals Congress’s recognition that candidates 
should be treated as a separate class under the law. 
 8 We do not use the rule of lenity to reach this conclusion 
because we find that the statutory text is sufficiently clear after 
examining the legislative history and congressional purpose of 
the Hobbs Act.  However, we note that if we were unable to 
clarify the text, the rule of lenity would provide an additional 
basis to affirm the District Court.  The rule of lenity applies to 
ambiguous applications of the Hobbs Act, Scheidler v. Nat’l 
Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003), and “ensures 
there is fair warning of the boundaries of criminal conduct and 
that legislatures, not courts, define criminal liability.”  United 
States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 821 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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conspiracy count is valid because both elements of a conspiracy 
are met:  (1) criminal intent and (2) an overt act.  Specifically, 
the government argues the Manzos’ criminal intent 
“crystallized” when they agreed to accept future payments in 
exchange for future political favors.  It contends that when the 
Manzos accepted down payments in furtherance of this scheme, 
this constituted an overt act substantiating a charge for 
conspiracy. 
 The government also argues that the attempt counts are 
valid because both elements of an attempt are met.  An attempt 
conviction “requires evidence that [the defendants] (1) acted 
with the requisite intent to violate the statute, and (2) performed 
an act that, under the circumstances as [they] believe[] them to 
be, constitute[d] a substantial step in the commission of the 
crime.”  United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 469 (3d Cir. 
2006).  It contends that when the Manzos accepted down 
payments in furtherance of the schemes, this constituted a 
substantial step. 
 Neither party disputes that if every contingency upon 
which this case is based had occurred (if Louis had won the 
election, accepted money as mayor of Jersey City, and 
subsequently misused his public office), the Manzos would have 
been guilty of a prototypical, substantive Hobbs Act violation.  
However, the two parties dispute the importance of Louis’s 
failure to obtain office.  The government maintains that his 
failure to obtain office constitutes a factual impossibility, which 
is not a defense to conspiracy or attempt.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 300 (2008); United States v. 
Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998).  The Manzos argue, and 
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the District Court agreed, that acting “under color of official 
right” is a required status element of any Hobbs Act violation, 
inchoate or substantive, that does not involve threatened force, 
violence or fear. 
 We agree that “[t]he Hobbs Act, by its own terms, 
encompasses the inchoate offenses of attempt and conspiracy to 
extort.”  United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 592 (3d Cir. 
1982) (en banc).  Moreover, the government need not prove 
every substantive element of an offense to establish an inchoate 
offense.  See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) 
(“The law of conspiracy identifies the agreement to engage in a 
criminal venture as an event of sufficient threat to social order to 
permit the imposition of criminal sanctions for the agreement 
alone, plus an overt act in pursuit of it, regardless of whether the 
crime agreed upon actually is committed.”).  In fact, a Hobbs 
Act conspiracy charge does not even require that “‘the ends of 
the conspiracy were from the very inception of the agreement 
objectively []attainable.’”  Hsu, 155 F.3d at 203 (quoting 
Jannotti, 763 F.2d at 591).  We also agree that factual 
impossibility, or the fact that the agreement was “objectively 
unattainable,” is not a defense to a charge of conspiracy or 
attempt.  Hsu, 155 F.3d at 203.  We disagree, however, with the 
importance of Louis’s failure to obtain public office. 
In support of its argument that this case turns on factual 
impossibility, the government points to United States v. 
Ledesma-Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2003).  In that case, the 
defendant was charged with attempted possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law 
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Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”).  The MDLEA makes it a crime 
to attempt or conspire to “board a vessel subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States,” and “possess with intent to 
manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.”  46 App. 
U.S.C. § 1903(a).  Ledesma-Cuesta had four kilograms of 
cocaine aboard a vessel bound for Philadelphia, but he was 
outside the territorial waters of the United States when he was 
discovered.  We concluded that this satisfied the requirements of 
attempt, an inchoate offense, because “he had already taken 
substantial steps toward possessing with intent to illegally 
distribute the cocaine in U.S. customs waters, making his actual 
location at the time of the apprehension immaterial.”  Ledesma-
Cuesta, 347 F.3d at 532.  Indeed, we noted that “[t]he case 
before us, then, is the exact type of case the MDLEA was 
designed to address: one in which the defendant is caught on the 
high seas, with drugs intended for illegal distribution once he 
reaches U.S. territory.”  Id. 
 Ledesma-Cuesta is distinguishable from the facts at hand 
because this is not the “type of case the [Hobbs Act] was 
designed to address.”9
                                                 
 9 The Manzos seek to distinguish this case on the basis 
that possessing drugs is always an illegal enterprise.  This 
distinction is not compelling because, at a minimum, the 
Manzos acted in violation of state campaign finance laws. 
  Id.  The Hobbs Act is intended to address 
a situation where a defendant is caught in public office, 
promising to misuse his office once he receives payment.  Here, 
the government seeks to extend inchoate principles to gloss over 
the failure of the central status element of an “under color of 
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official right” Hobbs Act violation: acting “under color of 
official right.”10
                                                 
 10 We also note that United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 
458 (3d Cir. 2006), is distinguishable.  There, the defendant was 
charged with interstate travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct 
with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and using an 
interstate facility to attempt to persuade a minor to engage in 
illegal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).  
Tykarsky argued that the indictment was insufficient because an 
undercover FBI agent was posing as a 14-year old girl, and 
therefore because no minor was actually involved in the charged 
offenses, it was legally impossible for him to commit the 
charged crime.  We observed that the distinction between legal 
impossibility and factual impossibility was “elusive[]” and that 
“many jurisdictions [have] eschew[ed] the distinction between 
legal and factual impossibility and abolish[ed] the defense 
altogether.”  Id. at 466.  However, we held that legal 
impossibility can sometimes be a defense to a crime, depending 
on legislative intent.  Id.  We concluded that the legislative 
history of § 2423(b) and § 2422(b) made clear that legal 
impossibility was not a defense to that particular crime, and it 
was sufficient that Tykarsky attempted to engage in illicit sexual 
conduct with a minor.  Id. at 468-69.  In contrast, the legislative 
history does not clearly extend application of the Hobbs Act to 
this circumstance.  It is not sufficient that the Manzos attempted 
to gain the status of acting “under color of official right.”  We 
leave for another day whether legal impossibility could be a 
defense to certain Hobbs Act conspiracy charges and from 
whose perspective we would analyze the conspiracy, the 
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 On the other hand, we have sustained a proper charge for 
conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act violation where a non-status 
element of the offense was not met.  In United States v. Jannotti, 
defendants Jannotti and Schwartz were convicted by a jury of 
conspiracy to extort in violation of the Hobbs Act.  673 F.2d 
578.  At the time of the acts in question, Schwartz was president 
of the Philadelphia City Council and Jannotti was the Council’s 
majority leader.  Both Schwartz and Jannotti accepted bribes 
from a cooperating witness for the FBI as part of the ABSCAM 
government operation designed to reveal government 
corruption.  The district court set aside the verdict and dismissed 
the conspiracy count for lack of jurisdiction.  Specifically, the 
district court concluded that because the scheme and the money 
were all entirely fictitious, there was no effect on interstate 
commerce.  We reversed and relied on the principle that “[a]ll 
that was necessary, in addition to an overt act, was that the 
intended future conduct they had agreed upon include[d] all the 
elements of the substantive crime.”  Id. at 593 (quoting United 
States v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1978)).  Accordingly, 
we ruled that the “defendants’ plan to transport the goods 
interstate, even though unattainable from the outset, sufficiently 
impinged on an area of federal concern to justify federal 
regulation and prohibition.”  Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 593. 
 The facts in Jannotti are directly analogous to the facts in 
Ledesma-Cuesta and distinguishable from the facts here.  
Jannotti represents the proper circumstances that support a 
charge for conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act violation.  In 
contrast to Jannotti, neither Louis nor Ronald ultimately acted 
                                                 
defendant’s or the victim’s. 
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“under color of official right,” the central status element of a 
Hobbs Act “under color of official right” violation.  
Accordingly, their actions do not sustain a charge for conspiracy 
or attempt. 
 Although this is a question of first impression in our 
Circuit, we note that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit decided a factually similar case, United States v. 
Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1976).  In Meyers, the 
defendants were candidates for public office who accepted 
money individually in consideration for their future official acts 
as trustees for the East Side Levee and Sanitary District.  The 
defendants ultimately obtained public office.  They were 
indicted for an inchoate offense, conspiracy to violate the Hobbs 
Act, and the district court framed the issue on appeal as 
“whether candidates for political office can obtain property (i.e., 
$6000) from another with that person’s consent induced under 
color of official right.”  Id. at 1035.  The district court concluded 
that “[a] mere candidate for public office can not obtain property 
from another with that person’s consent under color of official 
right.”  Id. 
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district 
court’s characterization of the issue.  It narrowed the issue on 
appeal to “whether, within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it is a 
crime for candidates for political office to conspire to affect 
commerce by extortion induced under color of official right 
during a time frame beginning before the election but not ending 
until after the candidates have obtained public office.”  Id. at 
1035 (emphasis added).  The court leaned on the “crucial factor 
of continuity in the crime of conspiracy,” and determined that 
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the conspiracy did not conclude until after the defendants took 
office.  Id. at 1036.  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that 
“the alleged conspiracy to obtain property under color of official 
right constitutes a crime under the Hobbs Act, even though [the 
defendants] were private citizens at the inception of the 
conspiratorial agreement.”  Id.  Although the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that “it is no less of a crime under the Hobbs Act to 
sell one’s public trust before, rather than after, one is installed in 
public office,” it rested its decision on the basis that the 
defendants ultimately obtained office.  Id. at 1038.11
 A Hobbs Act inchoate offense prohibits a person acting 
“under color of official right” from attempting or conspiring to 
 
                                                 
 11 Several other courts have drawn upon the reasoning in 
Meyers, but none has extended inchoate Hobbs Act violations to 
a candidate who never obtained public office.  In United States 
v. Forszt, the Seventh Circuit considered a defendant who began 
accepting bribes while in office but received the final payments 
after leaving office.  655 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1981).  It extended 
the period of criminality for a conspiracy charge to encompass 
the period after the defendant left office because he began to sell 
his “public trust” while still in office.  Id. at 104.  However, the 
reach of  Meyers was narrowed considerably in United States v. 
McClain, 934 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1991).  The Seventh Circuit 
stated:  “therefore we believe that, as a general matter and with 
caveats as suggested here, proceeding against private citizens on 
an ‘official right’ theory is inappropriate under the literal and 
historical meaning of the Hobbs Act, irrespective of the actual 
‘control’ that citizen purports to maintain over governmental 
activity.”  Id. at 831. 
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use his or her public office in exchange for payments.  It does 
not prohibit a private person who is a candidate from attempting 
or conspiring to use a future public office to extort money at a 
future date.  Conspiracy is a powerful tool that is often well-
utilized by the government; however “[i]ts history exemplifies 
the ‘tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its 
logic.’”  Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process 51 (1921)).  To sustain an “under color of 
official right” Hobbs Act charge here would create a “legal 
alchemy with the power to transform any gap in the facts into a 
cohesive extortion charge,” as feared by the District Court.  
Manzo, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 497.  No court has extended 
application of the Hobbs Act this far, and we decline to do so 
now. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  Acting “under color of official right” is a 
requirement of an extortion Hobbs Act offense, substantive or 
inchoate, when that offense does not involve threatened force, 
violence or fear.  Conduct by an unsuccessful candidate in an 
election does not meet that requirement. 
